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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
S'TAT'E. OF UTAH 
'TERNE J. OBERHANSL Y, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
TRAVELERS INSlTRANCE COl\IP ANY, 
a corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
REPI.JY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appellant considers it advisable to file a reply brief 
in answer to respondent's brief on Point Two in which 
the trial court found "that insured did not fail to 
cooperate "\\,.ith the defendant insurance company nor did 
he fail to rornply with the terms of said insur.ance con-
tract." 
Since the preparation of our original brief our at-
tention is called to a case just recently published: 
Penn Insurance Company vs. Horner 281 SW 
2nd 44 
The facts are Penn Insurance Company issued its com-
prehensive public liability policy to one Horner. He was 
driving his insured car. Kerr, a postal employee parked 
a government owned mail truck near the curb. He was 
sorting mail in the truck. Horner struck the truck a 
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glancing blo"r and then failed to·:s.top. His· identity·was· 
later discovered and he was .charged with hit and run 
driving, whereupon Horner fearing federal prosecution; 
signed a statement admitting, liability and agreeing to 
pay the damage to the truck. About. five months after 
the accident Kerr filed suit against Horner claiming 
he sustained personal injuries. The insurance company 
was not advised of the accident until the suit was filed, 
whereupon it began an investigation under a reserv.a-
tion of rights agreement. After doing so, the insurance 
company filed suit for a declaratory judgment claiming 
the policy void for failure to notify the company of the 
accident and for failure to cooperate as required by the 
policy. The Chancellor found in favor of the insurance 
company. The court of appeals found that the company 
was not prejudiced by the failure to give notice. On 
· appeal the Supreme Court of Tennessee stated the 
. ·,; .:. question-. was . wh~er failure of· insuror to notify 
the company.· arid ·his admission of liability relieved the 
Jinsu:ta·nce ·con1pany of. liability under the ter1ns of its 
.:\ ~--·. J>oliC.y-. :; The:::.court says : . 
. •:. 
"A provision requiring assistance and co-
.-:, •...... operation· is a condition precedent, failure to per-
..· . form which in the absence of waiver or estoppel 
· · constitutes a defense on the policy." 
.. ~ .. · ·'The.·:_ appellant court reversed the court of appeals and 
affirmed the Chancellor. 
Counsel for respondent contends:r· thaf· the· ~question 
.:. ·of diligence and good f.aith on the part ·.of the· insured 
is somehow tied into the question of-lack of ;cooperation 
and that when the court made a .. Sin1ple finding_· that 
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· ·· .·~ "the insured :did· :not· fail to cooperate with the 
;.. . . defendant insur~nce, ,company, nor did he fail to 
. comply with the terms of said i;ry.surance contract" 
' ' • • • ;' I' I 
that there , is. i~mpl~cit .i.n ... this finding the question of 
whether or not the .. :ins:nrance. co:q1pany exercised good 
faith and due diligence .. in its dealings. 'Yith the insured. 
We question the accuracy o~ th~s statement. The find-
ing is directed solely and wholly to the i;nsured and 
nothing is said about the insuror. H.ad the court believed 
from the evidence that the insuror was lacking in good 
faith or diligence, it would of necessity of had to find 
such to he the case and the failure so to find renders 
that subject moot and leaves for consideration the 
only question as to whether or not the insured under 
the ad1nitted facts in this case breached the terms and 
provisions of the policy. 
If we are in error in our position we nevertheless 
state emphatically that the evidence in this case shows 
a deliberate intent on the part of the insured, from . 
the time he left the State of Utah knowing .that .. a.:s~it 
was pending, to conceal his whereabouts and to refuse 
any further cooperation is clearly and conclusively 
established. When he left the State of Utah knowing 
that this suit had been filed against him, he not only 
failed to notify t~e company of his changed addres.s · · ,r. 
but attempted to conceal the same by going so far as to 
pledge his own a~t~.rney not to reveal to anyone his 
whereabouts. When::.·: the attorney for the defendant 
.. finally learned his ~4dress and sent him the registered 
~le.~t~~r: ~opi~d 1n our. ppen1ng brief, he did not answer 
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the same. He merely contented himself with telephoning 
his father and telling him to tell Young that he would 
not appear because of his job. After that, both his 
father and his attorney requested him to appear at the 
trial. He did not reply to his attorney's letter nor did 
he write the company or its attorney explaining his posi-
tion or advising why he could not come. It would have 
been an easy matter for him to have written the com-
pany or its attorney explaining his situation. In fact 
it must be remembered that the insured at no time after 
receiving the letter from defendant's attorney and later 
his own attorney ever advised assured directly that he 
would not appear for the trial on the date set. 
The insured claims that at the tin1e of the trial he 
was in line for a promotion and bec.ause of this fact it 
\Vas diffieult for him to leave his work. He does not 
contend that he ever cormnunicated this fact to the com-
pany or its attorney. He rnerely told his father to tell 
Young he would not come because of his work. Had he 
in good faith wanted to appear, it would have been a 
very simple rnatter for hin1 to have written explaining 
the fact that he was expecting a promotion; that if a 
continuance could be had that he would come at. a later. 
date. The attorneys for the defendant might then have 
been in a position to ask for a continuance, but his only 
eomment eonveyed through his father was that he would-
n't appear, not that he would appear at some future time. 
We have read the cases cited by respondent and most 
of these cases deal with a situation where the insured was 
not notified of the date of trial and the question would 
4 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
naturally· arise .as to whether or not the insured had 
~xercised due· diligence . in attempting to locate him. 
H0wever, that is not this case. In this case the assured 
admits that he, re.ceived the notice of the date of trial 
byLregistered letter.' He .admits that he never attempted 
to-.contact either :the insurance comp'~Y or its attorney. 
He was- advised of the necessity . for his appearance in 
court and the consequences: .which would _re~ult if he 
failed to attend, yet in -the face of th~s he made no ef-
fort whatsoever to cooperate either in procuring a con-
tinuance or in attending the trial. vVhile nothing was 
s.aid in the first letter concerning expenses, he v1as told 
by his own attorney that he was sure the company would 
take care of this matter but this is immaterial anyway 
because in his deposition the assured states that that 
was not the reason he did not appe;ar. In other words, 
he would not have come had his expenses been tendered 
him. 
. . . Counsel talks about the necessity for the insurance 
company to act in good faith. We agree. We say that 
the. ins:q.r~nce company at all times acted in the utmost 
good faith.· .If~ a request by the company through its 
attorney, the request of his own father and of his own 
attorney. would· not bring him here, we know of no 
~ther efforts which could. have produced the desired re-
·sult .. 
The policy does not require the insured to force 
.the insuror to attend hearings. The promise is that of 
the ins-ured that when reqnested he will attend. Counsel 
quotes copiou~ly .from the ~~se _of_,_ 
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Strode vs. Commercial C.asualty Insurance 
Comp.any 102 Fed. Supp. 240 
wherein the court makes reference to the apparent de-
sire of the insurance company to avoid the policy. How-
eve-r, on appeal to the Circuit ~Jourt, 202 Fed. 2nd., 599, 
the court affirmed the decision on the sole grounds that 
"from a consideration of the entire record in 
the cause it is the opinion of this court that Mrs. 
Campbell was not given reasonably timely notice 
of the trial date, assuming that she received 
any notice after the case had been set for trial 
some ten days previously with the approval of 
the attorney for the appellant." 
The court, however, states that all references to the 
insurance company only looking for an excuse to abandon 
its insurance case and made no effort to take any step 
for the benefit of the defendant's insured was not sup-
ported by the evidence. However, that might be, in this 
case the insuror not only did not .abandon the case but, 
recognizing its responsibility, it represented the defend-
ant under a reservation of rights agreement to the very 
best of its ability without aid of the defendant. 
Respectfully submitted, 
YOUNG, THATCHER & GLASMANN 
Attorneys for Defendant and .Appellant 
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